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Abstract
We develop a model of trade between identical countries. Workers endogenously acquire
skills that are imperfectly observed by firms, who therefore use aggregate country investment as
the prior when evaluating workers. This creates an informational externality interacting with
general equilibrium effects on each country’s skill premium. Asymmetric equilibria with com-
parative advantages exist even when there is a unique equilibrium under autarky. Symmetric,
no-trade equilibria may be unstable under free trade. Welfare effects are ambiguous: trade may
be Pareto improving even if it leads to an equilibrium with rich and poor countries, with no
special advantage to country size.
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I Introduction
In this paper we develop a stylized model of international trade in which a country can
establish a reputation for having a high quality labor force, providing new insights to the
understanding of the causes of trade, specialization, and inequality across countries.
A reputation for high or low quality of the labor force may arise when employers do
not perfectly observe workers’ competencies and skills. Workers acquire human capital
not only through education and work experience, but also with personal effort and in-
vestments that are not as easily observable. We focus on this informational asymmetry,
showing that it may generate self-fulfilling reputational differences across countries.
Research has shown that informational asymmetries of this kind are empirically rel-
evant. Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) first showed that
employers’ learning is significant, supporting the assumption that employers initially ob-
serve workers’ skills with noise.1 Recent literature confirms these results2 suggesting a
significant scope for the mechanism proposed in this paper to play a role in determining
workers’ wage distribution, incentives to acquire skills, and sorting across industries.
Based on this evidence, one cannot dismiss the possibility that labor market informa-
tional asymmetries may play a role in explaining, at least in part, trade and specialization
across countries. In this paper, we demonstrate that they are sufficient to generate self-
fulfilling cross-country differences in reputation that imply human capital differences,
trade, and specialization between otherwise identical countries. There is arguably an
incomplete understanding of the patterns of trade and specialization observed in the real
world, which suggests that exploring alternative models could provide new insights.3
1In most of the literature, the identification of the main effect exploits panel data where workers are
observed over time. If employers imperfectly observe workers’ skills, but learn over time through the
observation of productivity signals, then as tenure increases wages should become more correlated with
measures of productivity available to the researcher (typically, workers’ scores in aptitude tests).
2In particular, Lange (2007) measured the “speed” of employer learning finding that, according to the
best estimates, it takes three years for an employer to reduce her expectation error to 50 percent of its
initial value, and 26 years to reduce it to less than 10 percent of its initial value. Note that median em-
ployee tenure is currently just above 4 years, (January 2016, see the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics news
release “Employee Tenure”, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.toc.htm, last accessed: February
9, 2018). See also Scho¨nberg (2007), Pinkston (2009), and Kahn and Lange (2014) using U.S. data,
and Lesner (2017) with Danish data. Cornwell et al. (2017) use Brazilian data to show that employer
variation in workers’ perceived race significantly affects wages.
3A full empirical investigation of the model implications, which would require accounting for (and
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In our model, technology has constant returns to scale, a country is defined as a
labor market, and international trade is frictionless. Countries are symmetric in every
respect, therefore the model always admits symmetric equilibria that replicate autarky,
without gainful trade. The only aspect of the model that is non-standard is workers’
skill acquisition. We investigate the conditions that generate equilibria with asymmetric
country reputations for skill investments and show the properties of such equilibria.
Workers can acquire skills at a cost that varies across workers. There are two sec-
tors demanding labor, a “high tech” sector and a “low tech” sector, and skills increase
productivity only in the high tech sector. Incentives to acquire skills are affected by
an informational asymmetry: workers’ skills are only observed by employers with noise,
through a signal of productivity that may be thought of as aggregating information pro-
vided by the worker’s curriculum, interviews, and observation in the workplace. A worker
without skills, which we henceforth call an unqualified worker, may send a good signal,
but this is less likely than a qualified worker (a worker with skills) sending a good signal.
Before observing the noisy signal, the prior probability of investment is determined
in each country by aggregate investment rates summarized by the proportion of qualified
workers. The probability of investment of each worker is then computed using her signal,
but is also affected by the prior. Hence, the actual proportion of qualified workers,
together with endogenous relative prices, determines incentives to invest. There is no
point in investing in skills if there are very few qualified workers in the country because
firms interpret a good signal as most likely being noise and the good signal raises the wage
very little. Symmetrically, if almost all workers invest, firms ignore bad signals as “bad
luck,”and again there is no point in investing since all workers get high wages regardless of
the signal. Incentives to invest are at the highest at some intermediate level of aggregate
investment because this is when firms pay most attention to the noisy signals.
Hence, starting from a relatively low level of investments, the value to acquire human
capital increases if the proportion of skilled workers in the economy increases as the
signal to noise ratio decreases. Working against this there are relative price effects that
separately identifying) other relevant factors, is outside the scope of this paper.
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make the high-tech good less valuable when its supply increases, but these effects are
smaller when countries trade than in autarky. Additionally, when skills increase in one
country, the incentives to acquire skills in the other country are unambiguously reduced
because of the price effects. Hence, an asymmetric allocation of human capital and goods
production may arise even if countries are fundamentally identical. As far as we know,
this is an explanation of trade and specialization that is novel in the international trade
literature. What is crucial for this result is that the reputation for having a qualified
labor force is like a public good, operating within a country regardless of its size.
While our mechanism is novel, there are some similarities with models of agglomera-
tion. Scale economies and network effects can also create asymmetries between countries.
However, these models usually assume some exogenous differences that are being accen-
tuated in equilibrium. Moreover, in these models it is typically an advantage to have a
large domestic market, whereas in our model there is no systematic effect favoring large
countries. It is not the number, but the proportion of qualified workers that is critical in
generating the reputational externality because employers, when assessing workers, use
the proportion of qualified worker as their prior for human capital investment. A worker
is more likely to be qualified the higher her country’s proportion of qualified workers.
We highlight this irrelevance of country size by showing that large economies have
no systematic advantage. In many parameterizations where country sizes are allowed
to differ, there is an equilibrium where the large country is the richer as well as an
equilibrium in which the small country is the richer. Which of these equilibria leads to
more inequality or higher welfare is also a matter of parameter choices.
Asymmetric equilibria arise under free trade, but as already noted, there is always at
least one symmetric equilibrium with no gainful trade that replicates the autarky alloca-
tion. However, several properties of our model suggest that coordinating on an asymmet-
ric equilibrium may be plausible.4 First, this is not a model in which some countries are
trapped in a coordination failure and others are not. Incentives in one country depend
on investments in the other and relative price effects are crucial. Asymmetric equilibria
4Matsuyama (2002) argues that multiplicity by itself does not offer a compelling reason for observed
asymmetries.
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may therefore occur even if the autarky equilibrium is unique. Moreover, the stability
conditions under autarky differ from the stability conditions under free trade. Opening
up international trade may destabilize the unique and stable autarky equilibrium, so cross
country income differences may be an inevitable aspect of free trade even if there are no
exogenous differences that “explain” which country becomes richer.
In any asymmetric equilibrium, a country with more human capital is richer and
better off than the other country. However, this does not necessarily imply that the poor
country is worse off under trade than autarky. Welfare in the poor country can go either
way, but we emphasize the less intuitive possibility by showing an example where an
asymmetric equilibrium Pareto dominates the autarky equilibrium. The intuition is that
an increase in the skill level abroad may drive down the relative price of the high-tech
good so much that exchanging the low-tech good for the high-tech good generates higher
welfare in the poor country compared to domestic production.
Our results are robust to introducing exogenous productivity differences. If one coun-
try has a “fundamental” comparative advantage in the high-tech industry, it may still
specialize as a low-tech industry as a result of the mechanism in our model, provided that
the exogenous differences are not too large.
The next section discusses the contribution of this paper relative to existing litera-
ture. Section III introduces the model, defines the equilibrium, and shows that it can be
characterized as a planner’s problem, simplifying the analysis that follows. Section IV
characterizes the equilibria under autarky. The main result, the existence of equilibria
with trade and specialization, is presented in Section V. Section VI discusses the stability
and welfare properties of equilibria with trade, and the irrelevance of size. Section VII
concludes discussing the robustness of the results to extending the model to multiple
countries, to including physical capital, and migration.
II Related literature
Our main contribution to the literature is to suggest a novel source of trade and compar-
ative advantage between identical countries. There are several papers in the literature
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that include some of the crucial elements of our model, imperfectly observed human cap-
ital accumulation, but in those models either some exogenous differences are posited, or
equilibrium multiplicity in a baseline autarky model is the driving source of specialization.
Our model relates to a literature on trade and endogenous skill formation initiated
by Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), who develop a general equilibrium model where the
driver of trade is endogenous human capital acquisition as in our model. Countries
specialize because of exogenous differences in the availability of inputs needed to acquire
human capital, generating what we refer to as price effects. In our setup instead, countries
are identical also in the cost of acquiring human capital.5
Among the papers presenting models with asymmetric information, Grossman and
Maggi (2000) and Grossman (2004) have elements that are similar to our setup: a
Hecksher-Ohlin model with imperfectly observable skills. They focus on comparative
statics with respect to changes in the skill distribution. For their purposes it is sufficient
to consider how trade is affected by exogenous differences in the talent distribution across
countries, ignoring the incentives to acquire skills that are central in our model.6
Costinot (2009), like us, seeks to formulate a more fundamental theory of comparative
advantage. The technology is also based on the idea that human capital is more important
for some firms than for others. The main difference is that the model ultimately derives
country differences from exogenous differences in institutional quality and human capital.
Chisik (2003) derives trade in a model where products may acquire, in equilibrium,
5The focus of this literature is mainly in showing how even if factor price equalization holds (for
the marginal worker), trade induces different incentives to acquire human capital across countries. For
recent extensions see also Ranjan (2001), Falvey et al. (2010), Auer (2015), Unel (2015), Blanchard and
Willmann (2016), and Danziger (2017). In some cases, the exogenous country differences are assumed
by analyzing the effects of trade on a small open economy that takes the world price as given, as in
Cartiglia (1997), Bougheas et al. (2011), Bonfatti and Ghatak (2013), or Harris and Robertson (2013).
6Several papers study the effects of informational asymmetries on trade, without focusing on how
trade arises in equilibrium. Vogel (2007), studies the effect of institutional quality on reducing workers’
moral hazard. Davidson and Sly (2014), study how trade affects one country’s human capital accumu-
lations when education has a signaling role. Park (2011) analyzes trade agreements under imperfect
public monitoring, Zhang (2012) consider effects of asymmetric information when exporters are credit
constrained, and Creane and Jeitschko (2016) show that weak institutions may result in welfare-reducing
trade in an adverse selection model. Razin and Sadka (2003) use an informational asymmetry to model
the role of foreign direct investments, Casella and Rauch (2002) derive a role for minority groups in inter-
national trade using an informational friction, and McCalman (2002) considers the impact of asymmetric
information in bargaining about trade agreements. Eicher (1999) considers a model that is significantly
richer than ours in many ways, but the informational asymmetry is modeled in reduced form.
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different reputation for quality. Self-fulfilling reputation determines the average quality
of a country exports, and comparative advantages arise endogenously because countries
coordinate on selecting different equilibria.7 Similarly, in Chatterjee (2017) comparative
advantages emerge endogenously as a Nash equilibrium of a game in which countries
choose policies that affect sector-specific productivities or relative factor endowments. In
these papers equilibrium multiplicity is needed to generate the comparative advantage.
In our model instead, trade may arise even when there is a unique autarky equilibrium.
While our underlying assumptions are very different, our model shares many features
with trade models with increasing returns (Ethier (1982), Krugman (1980)), their ver-
sions usually referred to as “agglomeration models” (Krugman and Venables (1995), Puga
and Venables (1999)), and the “symmetry-breaking” literature (see Matsuyama (1996,
2004)). Agglomeration models can sustain a concentration of (high-income) manufac-
turing because production costs decrease with the size of the industry. Manufactured
goods are inputs in the production of other goods, implying that being close to other
producers saves on transportation costs. This creates incentives to concentrate produc-
tion. When production costs are neither too small nor too large, there are equilibria
where manufacturing is concentrated in one country that becomes richer.
While our model is considerably less complicated and closer to the neoclassical bench-
mark than models with increasing returns, there is a close similarity in how a pecuniary
externality interacts with local market conditions. There are also crucial differences: our
model resorts to imperfect information rather than global increasing returns. Agglomer-
ation models predict a positive relation between size and development whereas our model
has no such implications, as illustrated in Section VI. This is because what matters in
determining a country’s reputation is the proportion, not the number of skilled workers.
We borrow some of the modeling assumptions from the statistical discrimination liter-
ature. In Moro and Norman (2004) racial differences arise in a statistical discrimination
model because groups specialize in the level of acquired skill. Here, countries take the
7Other models based on trust and endogenous quality reputation are Araujo and Ornelas (2007),
Araujo et al. (2016), Rasmusen (2017), and Basu and Chau (1998), who assume countries are initially
asymmetric as they differ in the endowment of human capital.
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role of racial groups, but embedding the reputational effects in a model in which spillover
are carried by equilibrium price effects creates some additional complications. To make
the analysis more transparent we have therefore simplified the information technology
(the noisy signal has support on two realizations), the production technology (it is lin-
ear), so complementarities arise here because of convexity in preferences only. All these
simplifications can be relaxed at the cost of some additional complexity of the analysis.
III The Model
Two countries, labeled by j = h, f, are populated by a continuum of agents of mass λh
and λf = 1−λh, respectively. Agents are price takers. We build on a simple 2×2×2 trade
model but with factors of production being workers with and without human capital. The
model is closed by a stylized human capital acquisition and an informational technology
borrowed from the statistical discrimination literature.8 Workers cannot migrate.
Agents can invest in human capital. Investment is binary, the investment cost c is
private information, drawn from a cumulative density G independent of which country
the agent lives in, defined on the interval [c, c]. We call workers who invest in human
capital qualified and the others unqualified. Agents have the same preferences. The
utility of an agent consuming the bundle (x1, x2) is u (x1, x2)− c if the agent invests and
u (x1, x2) otherwise, where u is a homothetic and strictly quasi-concave.
After the investments, nature assigns each worker a signal θ ∈ {g, b} observed by em-
ployers. For simplicity we assume that Pr [g|worker qualified] = Pr [b|worker unqualified] =
η > 1
2
(that is, g is good news). Our preferred interpretation is that the unobservable
investment is a costly effort decision and the signal is an imperfect measure of the costly
effort, aggregating information from letter of recommendation, grades, tests, etc. . . .
The two consumption goods are produced solely from qualified and unqualified labor,
denoted q and n respectively, according to
y1 (q, n) = q; y2 (q, n) = q + n. (1)
8See Coate and Loury (1993)
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All workers are thus perfect substitutes in industry 2, whereas only qualified workers
contribute to the production of good 1.9
Next, after defining equilibrium, we show that given human capital investment the
equilibrium in the goods and labor markets can be characterized as the solution to a
planners’ problem, simplifying the derivations that follow. The section concludes with a
graphical representation of the production possibilities set.
Equilibrium
Our notion of equilibrium is analogous to a competitive equilibrium in a perfect informa-
tion environment, but the informational asymmetry makes the treatment of the “labor
supply” somewhat non-standard: skilled labor is endogenously determined by incentives
that depend on prices derived from the goods markets.
Consider an agent with realized wage w deciding how to allocate her earnings between
the two goods given prices p = (p1, p2). The (ex-post) maximized utility of the worker is
v(w, p) = max
x1,x2
u (x1, x2) , subject to p1x1 + p2x2 ≤ w. (2)
By strict quasi-concavity of u (x1, x2), the optimization problem in (2) has a unique
solution. We denote the demand functions by x1(w, p), x2(w, p).
Employers cannot observe if a worker is qualified, so a labor demand is a map l :
{g, b} → R+. Denote with pi any fraction of qualified workers in a country, which can be
thought of as the prior probability that a worker is qualified, before observing the signal.
Employers then use Bayes’ rule to form the posterior, conditional on her signal:
µ (g, pi) ≡ ηpi
ηpi + (1− η) (1− pi) µ (b, pi) ≡
(1− η) pi
(1− η) pi + η (1− pi) . (3)
Associated with any fraction of qualified workers, pi, and a given labor demand l, the
corresponding quantities of qualified and unqualified workers are:
q = l (g)µ (g, pi) + l (b)µ (b, pi) (4)
n = l (g) (1− µ (g, pi)) + l (b) (1− µ (b, pi)) ,
9This extreme technology is for simplicity only. In previous versions we considered a more general
technology with one good being more intensive in skilled labor than the other. This generalization creates
no additional qualitative insights. Qualitatively, we need two sectors with different factor intensities, just
like in the Hecksher-Ohlin model with fixed factor endowments.
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We assume that a strong law of large numbers applies and treat q and n in (4) as both
expected and realized inputs of labor.
Without loss of generality there is a representative firm in each sector and each coun-
try, which takes a wage schedule wj : {g, b} → R+ and output prices pi as given.10 Using
(1) and (4), the profit maximization problem for firms in either sector is:
Sector 1: max
l
p1
(
l (g)µ
(
g, pij
)
+ l (b)µ
(
b, pij
))− wjgl (g)− wjb l (b) (5)
Sector 2: max
l
p2 (l (g) + l (b))− wjgl (g)− wjb l (b) (6)
Agents have rational expectations about the wages and prices, but face uncertainty
about the realization of the signal. Denoting v (w, p) the indirect utility function defined
in (2), the expected utility for an agent in country j with investment cost c is
ηv(wjg, p) + (1− η) v(wjb , p)− c if the worker invests in human capital (7)
(1− η)v(wjg, p) + ηv(wjb , p) if not (8)
The worker is better off investing if and only if (7) exceeds (8), or if the cost of investment
is less than the gross incentives. The implied proportion of investors in country j is thus
pij = G
(
(2η − 1) (v(wjg, p)− v(wjb , p))
)
. (9)
To sum up: optimal consumption plans are defined in (2), (5) and (6) describe the profit
maximization problems for each sector, and (9) summarizes the individually optimal
human capital investments. What remains to describe are the market clearing conditions.
Factor market clearing requires that the aggregate demand for workers with each signal
equals the mass of agents who draw the signal. That is, let lji = (l
j
i (g) , l
j
i (b)) be a labor
demand scheme in industry i and country j. The labor market clearing conditions are:
lj1 (g) + l
j
2 (g) = ηpi
j + (1− η) (1− pij) (10)
lj1 (b) + l
j
2 (b) = (1− η)pij + η(1− pij).
Finally, for the product market equilibrium conditions let xji be the output in industry i
10The caveat is that the informational asymmetry would disappear if (qualified) workers could start
their own firms. We rule this and other contractual solutions to the informational asymmetry out by
assumption. One way to justify this is to assume that there is a minimum efficient scale for production
and that only aggregate output, and not the performance of individual workers, can be observed.
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and country j. That is xj1 = l
j
1 (g)µ (g, pi
j) + lj1 (b)µ (b, pi
j) and xj2 = l
j
2 (g) + l
j
2 (b) , which
allows us to write the product market clearing conditions for the world market as
∑
j=h,f
λj(xji −
[
ηpij + (1− η) (1− pij)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
#agents with wage wjg
xi(w
j
g, p)−
[
(1− η)pij + η(1− pij)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
#agents with wage wjb
xi(w
j
b , p)) = 0 (11)
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium consists of output prices p∗, wages wj∗, labor
demands lj∗i , outputs x
j∗
i , and fractions of qualified workers pi
j∗ for each country j = h, f
and industry i = 1, 2 , satisfying:
(a) lj∗1 solves (5) and l
j∗
2 solves (6) given pi = p
∗
i and x
j∗
1 and x
j∗
2 are the associated
profit maximizing outputs in j = h, f
(b) the product market clearing conditions in (11) are satisfied.
(c) the factor market clearing conditions in (10) are satisfied.
(d) pij∗ satisfies (9) given p = p∗ and wages wj = wj∗for j = h, f
We refer to a situation where all equilibrium conditions except the optimal investment
condition (d) are fulfilled as a continuation equilibrium.11
A Planning Characterization of Continuation Equilibria
For an informationally unconstrained planner, a continuation equilibrium is inefficient:
qualified and unqualified workers with the same signal are treated symmetrically, resulting
in job misallocations. However, if the informational asymmetry is viewed as a property
of the environment, then the equilibrium is (constrained) efficient conditional on the
investment behavior. This allows us to describe aggregate equilibrium allocations as
solutions to the planning problem:
max
(x1,x2)∈XW (pih,pif)
u (x1, x2) , (12)
where XW
(
pih, pif
)
is the world production possibilities set.
Proposition 1 Suppose that u (x1, x1) is homothetic. Then:
1. In any continuation equilibrium, aggregate world consumption i is a solution to (12)
2. Suppose that (x∗1, x
∗
2) solves (12), (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) is a normal to a hyperplane that separates
11This term is mainly due to lack of a better alternative. Due to the workers being non-atomic it does
not make a difference whether investments are made before or simultaneously with the wage posting.
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dx2
dx1
= −piη+(1−pi)(1−η)piη
dx2
dx1
= −pi(1−η)+(1−pi)ηpi(1−η)
piη pi
pi(1− η) + (1− pi)η
x1
x2
1
Figure 1: Per capita production possibilities in a country
the set of bundles such that u (x1, x2) ≥ u (x∗1, x∗2) and XW
(
pih, pif
)
, and that wj∗g =
max {p∗1µ (g, pij) , p∗2} and wj∗b = max {p∗1µ (b, pij) , p∗2} in each country j. Then these prices,
wages and aggregate consumption are part of a continuation equilibrium.12
The proof is in Appendix 1. The proposition shows that, for fixed investments, ver-
sions of the welfare theorems hold: the equilibrium is characterized by a planning prob-
lem where the informational asymmetry is built into the feasible set. It immediately
follows that, given any
(
pih, pif
)
there is a unique continuation equilibrium up to a re-
normalization of the prices. This allows us to appeal to simple graphs in the analysis.
The Production Possibilities Set
A useful way to represent technology is in terms of the production possibilities set. The
set of feasible production plans in a country depends on the fraction of workers that
invest in human capital, pi. Figure 1 illustrates the (per capita) production possibilities
set in a country, which we denote with X (pi).
To understand the figure, first observe that (x1, x2) = (0, 1) if all workers are producing
good 2, and that (x1, x2) = (pi, 0) if all workers are producing good 1, because only a
fraction pi of the workers are productive in Sector 1. There are piη+(1− pi) (1−η) workers
with signal g and pi (1− η) + (1− pi) η workers with signal b. If all signal g workers are
in Sector 1 (piη of these workers are productive) and all signal-b workers are in Sector 2,
then the outputs are given by the point at the kink in the graph. The frontier to the
12The allocation of workers in each country is somewhat complicated to describe in general, but is
implicitly pinned down as the (almost always) unique allocation that can produce the equilibrium bundle.
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right of the kink is steeper because in that region all g workers are employed in Sector
1, therefore to increase production firms must employ more b workers, who are less likely
to be qualified. To the left of the kink instead, only g workers are employed in Sector 1.
The world production possibilities set is given by XW
(
pih, pif
)
= λhX
(
pih
)
+λfX
(
pif
)
and is convex by convexity of X (pi). The next proposition immediately follows, since the
production possibilities set becomes (weakly) flatter as investment increases:
Proposition 2 Suppose that u (x1, x1) is homothetic. Then in any continuation equi-
librium the relative price of the high-tech good is (weakly) decreasing in the countries’
investment pih and pif .
IV A Parametric Specification
While the results presented below are more general, for simplicity of exposition in the
remainder of the paper we will restrict attention to Cobb-Douglas preferences, u (x1, x2) =
xα1x
1−α
2 , which imply demand functions:
x1(p, w) =
αw
p1
x2(p, w) =
(1− α)w
p2
. (13)
The continuation utility for a worker that earns wage w is therefore:
v(w, p) =
αα(1− α)1−α
pα1p
1−α
2
w. (14)
We normalize setting p2 = 1 and, abusing notation, write p (pi) , w
j
g (pi) and w
j
b (pi) for the
unique continuation equilibrium prices and wages in good 2 units, where pi =
(
pih, pif
)
.
A qualified worker earns wjg (pi) with probability η and w
j
b (pi) with probability 1− η.
Symmetrically, an unqualified worker earns wjg (pi) with probability 1−η and wjb (pi) with
probability η. Computing the expectation of v(w, p) in (14) conditional on investment
and subtracting from this the expectation of v(w, p) conditional on not investing we get
the gross benefits of investment for an agent in country j, denoted Bj (pi) :
Bj (pi) = E {v (w, p) |qualified} − E {v (w, p) |unqualified} (15)
= αα(1− α)1−α(2η − 1)(w
j
g (pi)− wjb (pi))
(p (pi))α
.
Using condition (d) in Definition 1 we see that any pi such that pij = G (Bj (pi)) for
13
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piη pi x1
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J
J
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-
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-
piη pi x1
-
Type A Type B Type C
pi (1− η)
+η(1− pi)
Figure 2: Three types of continuation equilibria
j = h, f gives an equilibrium fraction of investors in each country. All that remains to
calculate full equilibria is to derive expressions for the continuation equilibrium prices.
Continuation Equilibria in Autarky
As a benchmark, we first consider a closed economy. Suppressing the country index,
we write pi for the proportion of qualified workers. There are three possible types of
continuation equilibria, illustrated in Figure 2.13
Type A equilibria (allocation of workers “according to signals”). Graphically,
this type occurs when the tangency is at the kink of the feasible set. All workers with
signal b (g) are working in the low (high) tech sector. Outputs are x1 = ηpi and x2 =
(1− η)pi+ η (1− pi) , so the demands in (13) pin down the price of the high-tech good as
p (pi) =
α
1− α
(1− η)pi + η (1− pi)
ηpi
. (16)
Candidate equilibrium wages are obtained by the zero profits condition. Since p2 = 1, this
immediately gives wb (pi) = 1. The high-tech firm sells ηpi units at price p (pi) and hires
ηpi+ (1− η) (1− pi) workers with signal g. Zero profits in Sector 1 therefore implies that
the wage in that sector, wg(pi), equals the price of good 1 times the expected probability
13This is a somewhat unfortunate aspect of having only 2 signals. With a continuum of signals we
would get a strictly convex production possibilities set and the tangency condition would determine a
unique threshold signal. However, as it is much simpler to compute explicit examples with two signals
we decided to stick with the more inelegant case. Calculations are straightforward but may be tedious.
We provided more detailed steps in the online appendix
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Type A if pi ≤ α+η−12η−1
Type B if pi ≥ α+η−12η−1
Type B
-
6
Figure 3: Types of autarky equilibria in the (α, η) space
that a worker with signal g is productive in that sector µ(g, pi):
wg (pi) = p (pi)µ (g, pi) = p (pi)
piη
piη + (1− η) (1− pi) , (17)
which has the alternative interpretation that wage equals the expected value of output.
Finally, we have to check that a high-tech firm has no incentive to hire signal b workers,
and that a low-tech firm has no incentive to hire signal g workers. These conditions
determine the region where a Type A equilibrium exists (see Figure 3).
Type B equilibria (mixing of good signals). In Figure 2, this corresponds to a
tangency to the left of the kink. Some workers with signal g work in Sector 2. These
workers earn the same wage as g-signal workers in Sector 1, and, since all workers in
the low-tech sector are paid their marginal product, 1, it follows that wg (pi) = wb (pi) =
1. This provides workers zero incentives to invest. Because this makes the case less
interesting for the full equilibrium, we refer the reader to the online appendix for details.
Type C equilibria (mixing of bad signals). This type occurs when the demand
for good 1 is strong (i.e. when the Cobb-Douglas share α is high). In Figure 2, this
corresponds to a tangency to the right of the kink. In this case a fraction β of workers
with signal b (defined below) works in Sector 1. Workers with signal b are paid 1 if
employed in the low-tech sector. This must equal to the wage when employed in the high
tech sector, which is equal to their expected productivity (price times their probability of
being productive). Therefore, wb (pi) = p(pi)·µ(b, pi) = 1 pins down the price of good 1 as
15
  


  


Figure 4: Gross incentives to invest under autarky
the inverse of the probability that a b-signal worker is productive in the high-tech sector,
p(pi) =
1
µ(b, pi)
=
pi(1− η) + (1− pi)η
pi(1− η) (18)
The price must also satisfy a relationship imposed by demand shares (13):
p (pi) =
α
1− α
x2 produced by b-workers︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− β) ((1− η) pi + η (1− pi))
ηpi︸︷︷︸
x1produced by g workers
+ β(1− η)pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
x1produced by b workers
(19)
Equating the right-hand sides of (18) and (19) determines the fraction of b-signal workers
employed in Sector 1, β. The solution reveals that a positive β exists if and only if α > η,
as illustrated in Figure 3. We refer the reader again to the online appendix for details.
Equilibrium investments in Autarky
To obtain a closed form expression for the incentives to invest as a function of pi substitute
the wages and prices derived above into (15). If α ≤ η, this function may be written as:14
B (pi) = max
{
(2η − 1)
(
piη
pi(1− η) + (1− pi) η
)α(
α− (piη + (1− pi)(1− η))
piη + (1− pi)(1− η)
)
, 0
}
.
(20)
Figure 4 plots B (pi) for two sets of parameter values. All values where B(pi) > 0 in
the figure correspond to type-A continuation equilibria, where g workers produce good
1 and b workers produce good 2. B (pi) is single-peaked, but not necessarily concave
(example in the right panel). Under different specifications of information and output
technology the single-peakedness may break down, but what remains true is that the
function is equal to zero at the extremes, and therefore must be initially increasing, and
14See the online appendix for a detailed derivation.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium fixed point maps for two values of c, with η = 2/3, α = 1/2
eventually decreasing. The reason is that if pi = 0 or pi = 1 workers are all equally
productive in the production of both goods regardless of their signal (in particular, they
are all unproductive in Sector 1 when pi = 0), therefore their wage does not depend on
the signal. But if better signals are not rewarded with higher wages, incentives to invest
are zero. Only when 0 < pi < 1 the signal carries information; workers that receive a
good signal are paid higher wages, generating positive incentives to invest.
Any pi such that pi = G (B (pi)) is an equilibrium fraction of investors. Since G (B (pi))
is continuous and takes values on [0, 1], existence follows trivially. The fixed point con-
dition is illustrated in Figure 5, computed with η = 2/3, α = 1/2 and G uniform over
[c, c], with c − c = 0.2. Changes in c correspond to shifts in the cost distribution. If
c < 0 (i.e. when some workers prefer to invest even without incentives) the equilibrium
is unique. For c = 0, there is a trivial equilibrium with no investment and an equilibrium
with pi > 0. As c gets slightly larger there are three equilibria (one with pi = 0), whereas
if c is sufficiently large (not shown in the figure), as the curve shifts to the right only the
trivial equilibrium with no investment remains.
In many examples that follow we assume that a unique equilibrium with pi > 0
exists under autarky.15 This is to highlight that country specialization does not rely
on countries coordinating on different equilibria of the autarkic model (with multiplicity
under autarky, further possibilities for specialization with trade arise). This assumption
15Sufficient conditions are that G ◦B is concave and c < 0. The first is a technical assumption needed
to ensure that G() does not intersect the 45 degree line from below. The second assumption posits that
an arbitrarily small fraction of workers like to make the investment even if there are no monetary gains.
We do not believe this to be unrealistic.
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also eliminates “nuisance equilibria” with zero investments and makes welfare analysis
sharper, not having to rely on comparisons between sets of equilibria.
V Equilibria in the Trade Regime
In this section we assume that h and f trade on a frictionless world market. We will
first prove by construction the main result of the paper: the existence of a asymmetric
equilibria with trade and specialization. Next, we will provide some evidence of the
generality of the result. While the replication of the autarky equilibrium in both countries
remains an equilibrium of the two-country model (with no trade), we will show in the
next section that this equilibrium may be unstable and conclude the analysis illustrating
some welfare properties of the equilibria with trade.
Illustration of the existence of asymmetric equilibria by construction
The simplest asymmetric equilibrium we can construct occurs when the poor country,
which we label as country h, is fully specialized in the low-tech sector. In such an
equilibrium, the wage gap in h is zero, so the fraction of qualified workers is pinned down
as pih = G (0) . The proportion of qualified workers in f solves a single variable fixed point
equation similarly to the autarky case, but with some extra production of x2 performed
in country h. Once pif is obtained from this condition, it only remains to check that firms
in h have no incentives to hire workers with signal g to produce the high-tech good.
To formalize the argument, assume G = U [0, 0.2]. Assuming all workers in country
h specialize in the production of x2, this induces zero incentives to invest, implying
pih = G(0) = 0 and no incentives to place any worker in Sector 1 in country h. There is
always a trivial equilibrium with pif = 0, zero production of good 1, and zero utility for
all, but we look for non-trivial equilibria with positive incentives to invest in f. If these
equilibria exist, the equilibrium in country f is of type A or C (a fraction 0 < β ≤ 1 of
bad signal workers producing good 1).16 The relative price of good 1 is pinned down by
16In equilibria of type B (mixing of good signals) some good signal workers produce good 2 and therefore
receive wage 1, which is the same as the wage of bad signal workers. This provides no incentives to invest
leading to the uninteresting equilibrium (pih, pif ) = (0, 0).
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conditions similar to the autarky case, but modified to take into account the production
of good 2 occurring in country h. The equivalent of (19) is:17
p
(
pif
)
=
α
1− α
x2 produced in f︷ ︸︸ ︷
λf
(
(1− β) (1− η) pif + η (1− pif))+ x2 in h︷︸︸︷λh
λf
(
ηpif + β(1− η)pif)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x1 produced in f
(21)
Where β = 0 if the equilibrium is of type A (no workers with signal b produce good 1) and
0 < β < 1 if the equilibrium is of type C (some b-signal workers produce good 1). This
equation defines the relative price of good 1 in a type-A equilibrium, and β in a type-C
equilibrium (because b workers are employed in both sectors, the price is determined by
equalizing their marginal productivity in the two sectors: p(pif )µ
(
b, pif
)
= 1).
To derive incentives to invest, we make two additional assumptions that do not hinder
the generality of the result, as we discuss below, but simplify the derivations: we set equal
Cobb-Douglas shares α = 1/2, information technology parameter η = 2/3, and equal
country sizes: λh = λf = 1/2. Simple algebraic simplifications, which we relegate to the
web appendix, show that the continuation equilibrium in country f is of type C. Workers
with signal b in f are employed in both sectors, therefore the price is pinned down by
equating the marginal product of these workers in the two sectors 1 = p(pif )µ(b, pif ),
which, using (3), and η = 2/3 implies p(pif ) =
(
2− pif) /pif . Wages are:
wfb = 1, w
f
g = p(pi
f )µ(g, pif ) =
2− pif
pif
2pif
1 + pif
.
Solving (21) for β, the fraction of b-signal workers in country f employed in Sector 1 is
β = (1+pif )/(4−2pif ). We are now in a position to derive incentives to invest in country
f. We substitute our derivations into (15) to obtain,
Bf (pif ) =
1
6
(√
p (pif )µ
(
g, pif
)− 1√
p (pif )
)
=
(
4− 2pif
1 + pif
− 1
)√
pif
2− pif , (22)
with µ (g, pi) = 2pi/(1 + pi) from (3). Note that (22) is equal to zero for pif = 0 or 1. The
equilibrium in country f is defined by the fixed-point equation pif = G
(
Bf
(
pif
))
with
one interior solution at pif = 0.49 with p = 3.095. As will be shown next, this type of
trade equilibrium is robust to perturbations of the parametric assumptions we made.
17Since we are looking for equilibria where pih = 0 we can drop the dependency of the price on pih.
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Solutions to pif = G
(
Bf
(
G(0), pif )
))
Solutions to pi = G (B(pi))
Solution to pi = G (B(0))
Figure 6: Equilibrium investments under trade with η = 2/3, α = 1/2 for different values
of c.
Robustness of the equilibria with trade
The cost distribution. We explore first how shifts in the cost distribution affect the
existence of asymmetric equilibria of the type we computed above (with full specialization
of h-country workers). Assume a uniform G over [c, c + 0.2], and treat the lower bound
of the distribution c as a variable, holding the other parameters fixed.
Figure 6 illustrates the results. The solid line represents equilibrium investments in
country f if there were no incentives to invest in country h. The dotted line is the
fraction that is willing to invest without incentives, and the line in between represents
equilibrium investments in autarky. It cannot be seen in the figure, but it can be shown
that pih = G (B (0)) is a best response given that the country f invests in accordance
with the solid line, so country h investing in accordance with the dotted line and f in
accordance with the solid line is an equilibrium under trade.
Both curves bend backwards, so there is a range with multiple equilibria in the autarky
model (see dashed line where c > 0). If c > 0 zero incentives in county h implies pih = 0.
As can be seen from the solid line bending backwards in this region, there are three best
responses in country f to pih = 0: one is the trivial equilbrium pif = 0 whereas two
have positive investment. There is also a range to the right of approximately c = 0.023
where there are two non-trivial asymmetric trade equilibria, despite the unique autarky
equilibrium being a trivial zero investment equilibrium (the dashed line can’t be seen
but it corresponds to the horizontal axis in this range). For example if c = 0.05, pif =
20
{0, 0.03, 0.31} are all best responses to pih = 0.
Multiple autarky equilibria are not necessary for trade to occur. For c approximately
between -0.07 and 0 there is an asymmetric equilibrium with trade, and a unique autarky
equilibrium. For example, when c = −0.05, 25 percent of workers from country h invest
even when there are no incentives to do so. Assuming that this is the case, and placing
all workers of country h in Sector 2, in country f most workers specialize in Sector 1,
generating incentives so that pif = 0.63 is the optimal response, with a relative price of
good 1 equal to 2.16. It remains to be checked that it is optimal to employ country h
workers with good signals in Sector 2. With pih = .25, the expected probability of being
qualified for a good worker is µ(g, 0.25) = 0.4, which multiplied by the price 2.16 gives
an expected productivity of 0.865, less than the unit productivity in Sector 2. In general,
one can verify that this condition, p(pif )η(g, pih) ≤ 1, is satisfied if 4pih
1+3pih
≤ pif , which
holds as long as pih = G(0) is small enough. Indeed for lower values of the lower bound
of the cost distribution not displayed in the figure, as the number of qualified workers in
country h increases, it becomes impossible to sustain this type of asymmetric equilibrium.
Country size and preference parameter. Existence of this type of trade equilibria
also does not hinge on our choice of the values of relative country size λh and of the
Cobb-Douglas preference parameter α. Figure 7 shows the production possibilities frontier
when all workers in country h produce good 2. An increase in λh shifts the production
possibilities frontier from the solid to the dashed line, but does not change the slope of
the frontier in correspondence to a type-C equilibrium, because the relative productivity
of workers in country f in the two sectors, determined by the information technology,
does not change. Similarly, a change in α changes the slope of the indifference curves.
Therefore, perturbations of α and λh (small enough so that the equilibrium remains of
type C in countryf) change the point of tangency but not the equilibrium price, which
is defined by the slope of the production possibilities set.18 Expected productivities,
determined by the price and the information technology, do not change, therefore wages
18Prices are constant because of the simplifying assumption that information technology has only two
signals available. With a more general information structure the production possibilities set would be
strictly convex, and small perturbations of λh or α would have a small effect on equilibrium prices. To
make the case that a nearby trade equilibrium still exists we would have to rely on continuity arguments.
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Figure 7: World production possibilities frontier when all in h produce good 2
do not change. Incentives and equilibrium investment remain the same in both countries.
Extreme specialization in country h. Asymmetric equilibria also do not depend on
the extreme specialization in country h we assumed to construct the equilibrium so far.
The analysis gets more complicated because when positive incentives to invest exist in
both countries, solving for equilibrium implies computing the solution to a system of
two equations. For an intuition, recall from Proposition 2 that the equilibrium price
is decreasing in pif (strictly, in some regions). From (15), incentives are increasing in
price because price increases wages of g-signal workers more than wages of b-signal work-
ers.19 Hence, an increase in investments abroad decreases prices and incentives at home.
Symmetrically, an increase in investments at home reduces incentives abroad. This is
a negative cross-country externality in human capital acquisition. These effects create
equilibria where countries specialize: rich countries export the high-tech good and poor
countries export the low-tech good, even with a unique autarky equilibrium.
Formally, consider the region of the parameter space where equiilbria are of type C or
A in both countries so that wjg = p(pi)µ(g, pi
j) and wjb = 1.
20 Differentiate (15) to obtain,
19Either b workers are employed only in Sector 2, in which case their wage is fixed at 1, or some are
employed in Sector 1, in which case their wage is p(pi)µ(b, pij) which is less than the wage of g-signal
workers employed in Sector 1, p(pi)µ(g, pij).
20This is necessary to have strictly positive incentives to invest in both countries
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using p as shorthand for p(pih, pif ) and introducing notation Ψ = (2η − 1)αα(1− α)1−α:
∂Bf
(
pih, pif
)
∂pif
= Ψp1−α
dµ(g, pif )
dpif︸ ︷︷ ︸
“information effect”
+ Ψp−α
(
(1− α)µ(g, pif ) + α
p
)
∂p
∂pif︸ ︷︷ ︸
“price effect”
(23)
∂Bh
(
pih, pif
)
∂pif
= Ψp−α
(
(1− α)µ(g, pif ) + α
p
)
∂p
∂pif︸ ︷︷ ︸
“price effect”
(24)
The price effect labeled in the equations is, as discussed, negative, and occurs in both
countries whereas the information effect bites only in the country where investment
changes. The information effect is positive because as the proportion of investors in-
creases, the probability that an individual with good signal is productive increases as
well, but its size depends on the size of pif . Hence, starting from a non-trivial autarky
equilibrium in which piA = pif = pih, an increase in pif either decreases function Bh and
increases Bf , or it shifts Bh downwards more than it shifts Bf . A decrease in pih has
the symmetrically opposite effect. These derivations illustrate why the informational
externality pushes countries to specialize. One can then find values pih < pif such that
Bh(pih, pif ) < Bf (pih, pif ). Whether these values satisfy the equilibrium conditions de-
pends on the cost distribution, but examples can be constructed to this end.21
VI Stability, Welfare, and the Irrelevance of Size
Stability
A symmetric equilibrium replicating autarky always exists in the trade regime. However,
this equilibrium can be unstable when the economy is open for trade.22
Consider a parameterization where piA is a stable autarky equilibrium.23 It follows
that pi =
(
piA, piA
)
is an equilibrium when the countries are allowed to trade.
21If one is willing to let the parameters of G be free, note for the sake of constructing a trade equilibrium
that there is an infinite number of probability distributions satisfying the three restrictions on their
domain that are needed for (pih, pif ) to hold as a trade equilibrium together with piA as an autarky
equilibrium: G(Bh(pih, pif )) = pih, G(Bf (pih, pif )) = pif , and G(B(piA, piA)) = piA.
22Because the model lacks real time, “stability” is a somewhat ad hoc criterion that corresponds
to the adjustment dynamic where pijt+1 = G(B
j(pijt , pi
k
t )), j, k = h, f, j 6= k (or the natural continuous
analogue). Embedding the model in an OLG framework one obtains such dynamic system if one assumes
that employers can not differentiate between workers of different cohorts.
23For example, when c < 0, we know there is a unique autarky equilibrium, which must be stable since
G(B(pi)) must intersect the 45o line from above.
23
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Figure 8: Best responses under trade and autarky, at the autarky equilibrium
We analyze the effects of small deviations from the symmetric equilibrium. Consider
the change in relative price first. When pih = pif = pi and assuming again η = 2/3
and α = 1/2, we are in the region where η ≥ α. The autarky equilibrium must be of
type A. One can derive that when the equilibrium is of type A in both countries, the
price is equal to p(pih, pif ) = (4− pih − pif )/2(pih + pif ),24 therefore p (pi, pi) = (2− pi) /2pi,
which is consistent with (16). Differentiating these expression gives: d
dpi
p(pi, pi) = −1
(pi)2
(relevant under autarky), and ∂
∂pif
p(pih, pif ) = −2
(pih+pif)
2 (relevant with trade). Evaluating
each expression at (piA, piA) we have:
d
dpi
p(pi, pi)
∣∣∣∣
pi=piA
− ∂p(pi
h, pif )
∂pif
∣∣∣∣
pih=pif=piA
=
−1
(piA)2
− −2
4 (piA)2
=
−1
2 (piA)2
< 0 . (25)
An increase in investments thus has a larger negative impact on the price in autarky,
as intuition suggests. Autarky is equivalent to the trade regime with the added restriction
that pih = pif = pi. We compare the effect of a change in investment on incentives to invest
(15) between the regimes. In the autarky case, we restrict the two arguments of Bf to be
equal, while they are unrestricted in the open economy case. With α = 1/2 and η = 2/3,
(23) further simplifies to obtain (using pA as shorthand for p(piA, piA)) :
dBj (pi, pi)
dpi
∣∣∣∣
pi=piA
=
√
pA
6
dµ (g, pi)
dpi
∣∣∣∣∣
pi=piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
“information effect”
+
1
12
√
pA
(
µ
(
g, piA
)
+
1
pA
)
dp(pi, pi)
dpi
∣∣∣∣
pi=piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
“price effect”
(26)
24See the online appendix for the detailed derivation.
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∂Bf
(
pih, pif
)
∂pif
∣∣∣∣∣
pih=piA
pif=piA
=
√
pA
6
dµ
(
g, pif
)
dpif
∣∣∣∣∣
pif=piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
“information effect”
+
1
12
√
pA
(
µ
(
g, piA
)
+
1
pA
)
∂p(pih, pif )
∂pif
∣∣∣∣
pih=piA
pif=piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
“price effect”
,
(27)
The effect on incentives is decomposed as a positive “information effect” and a negative
“price effect”. The information effect in (26) is the same as in (27), but, by (25), the price
effect is stronger in autarky, so the slope of Bf
(
pif , pih = piA
)
exceeds the slope of the
autarky benefits of investment B (pi) , when evaluating both functions at piA (see Figure
8). Hence, it is possible that G(Bf
(
pif , pih = piA
)
) intersects the 45o line from below at
pif = piA even if G (B(pi)) intersects from above. Since the curve G(Bf
(
pif , pih = piA
)
)
intersecting the 45o line from below is a sufficient condition for local instability this shows
that the autarky equilibrium may be destabilized by opening up for trade.25
Next, we illustrate some welfare properties of the equilibria with trade.
Example 1: specialization may be beneficial only to the rich country
Table 1 displays a parameterization where all country f citizens are better off in the
asymmetric trade equilibrium than in the unique autarky equilibrium, and where all
country h citizens are worse off in the asymmetric trade equilibrium than under autarky.26
Notice that the total world output of both goods is higher in the asymmetric equi-
librium (see the second row of the table). While prohibitive trade barriers would make
country h better off, it is also true that there exists transfer payments from f to h that can
make both countries better off relative to the autarky equilibrium. Hence there are some
productive gains from specialization despite the countries being fundamentally identical.
25Examples are easy to find. When c is uniformly distributed on [0, 2] , the unique (non-trivial) autarky
equilibrium is pi = .0067. The equilibrium where pif = pih = 0.067 is unstable under trade, while an
asymmetric equilibrium with pif = .0283, pih = 0 is stable.
26Although some agents change their investment behavior in the comparison across equilibria, this
does not complicate Pareto comparisons. The crucial fact is that (in the example) both qualified and
unqualified workers gain (lose) in country f (h). All workers in the rich country have the option to invest
as in the autarky equilibrium, so revealed preferences imply that all workers gain. Similarly, in the poor
country all workers have the option to invest as in the trade equilibrium when in autarky, so again, by
revealed preferences, all workers are better off in autarky.
25
η = 23 , α =
1
2 , c ∼ U [−.02, .18] Trade, Country h Trade, Country f Autarky
Equilibrium Investment pih = .1 pif = .548 pi = .269
Per Capita Production yh1 = 0, y
h
2 = 1 y
f
1 = .463, y
f
2 = .226 y1 = .179, y2 = .577
Per Capita Consumption xh1 = .189 x
h
2 = .5 x
f
1 = .274 x
f
2 = .726 x1 = y1 x2 = y2
Gross incentives to invest Bh(pih, pif ) = 0 Bf (pih, pif ) = .090 B(pi, pi) = .034
Gross expected utility .307 .446 .321
Expected utility net of inv. cost .308 .427 .319
Expected utility if invest .307− c .487− c .346− c
Expected utility if don’t invest .307 .397 .313
Wages whg = 1, w
h
b = 1 w
f
g = 1.875, w
f
b = 1 wg = 1.364, wb = 1
Expected Wage 1 1.452 1.154
Prices p1 = 2.648 p1 = 3.216
Table 1: Trade and autarky equilibria in Example 1
Example 2: specialization may make both countries better off
In this example trade makes both countries better off. For maximal simplicity we rig this
example so that the “free rider problem” in human capital investments is so severe that
the unique equilibrium under autarky is the trivial equilibrium. However, with trade, the
existence of the other country means that, for any investment pif in country f, the price
of good 1 is higher than without trade if there is no human capital investment in country
h. Hence, trade allows a new market to emerge that would not operate without trade.
Table 2 summarizes one example where the market for good 1 only operates with
international trade. There are multiple trade equilibria and the numbers in the table
η = 23 , α =
1
2 , c ∼ U [.04, .24] Trade, Country h Trade, Country f Autarky
Equilibrium Investment pih = 0 pif = .353 pi = 0
Production yh1 = 0, y
h
2 = 1 y
f
1 = .284, y
f
2 = .323 y1 = 0, y2 = 1
Consumption xh1 = .107, x
h
2 = .5 x
f
1 = .177, x
f
2 = .823 x1 = y1 x2 = y2
Gross incentives to invest Bh(pih, pif ) = 0 Bf (pih, pif ) = .111 B(pi, pi) = 0
Gross average utility .232 .381 0
Avg. utility net of inv. cost .232 .355 0
Expected utility if invest .232− c .452− c n/a
Expected utility if don’t invest .232 .342 0
Wages whg = 1, w
h
b = 1 w
f
g = 2.433, w
h
b = 1 wg = n/a, wb = 1
Expected Wage 1 1.647 1
Prices p1 = 4.660 p1 =n/a
Table 2: Trade and autarky equilibria in Example 2
26
refer to the one with the largest fraction of investors in the country producing good 1.27
Consumers are happier when consuming both goods than when consuming only one
good. Because a new market opens up, trade is beneficial for both countries.
Pareto Improving Inequality
The example presented above is extreme, but specialization through trade may more
generally be viewed as an imperfect “solution” to the informational problem.28 In the
example, there is no way for a market to open unless the rewards for getting into the
market are large enough. These rewards are bigger if only one country enters the market:
the same “kick” from the local informational externality is generated at a smaller negative
price effect. Specialization reduces the problem of under investment in human capital.
6
-
@
@
@
@
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
6
-
@
@s s ssB A C
D
A
E
s
s
x2
x1
x2
x1pi − k pikpi + k
Figure 9: Specialization expands the world production possibilities
Even in less extreme cases, both countries may gain from specializing: it is always
true that the production possibilities set expands when moving from a situation where
both countries invest at the same rate to an asymmetric investment profile for a constant
total quantity of investors in the world. Figure 9 assumes countries of equal size. In the
left panel, the dashed line represents the frontier when both countries invest at pi, whereas
the continous lines (with kinks at B and C) illustrate the frontiers in each country at an
asymmetric investment profile, but with the same aggregate investment.
On the right panel the continuous line (with kinks at D,A and E) is the world
production possibilities frontier under the same asymmetric investment profile assumed
27(pih, pif ) = (0, 0.0157), is also an equilibrium, but unlike the equilibrium in Table 2 it is unstable.
28For a detailed elaboration on this point in the context of discrimination, see Norman (2003).
27
in the left panel. The dashed line reproduces the dashed line from the left panel. The total
number of investors in the world is unchanged, but the world production possibilities set is
larger when countries specialize. To understand, note that the efficient way of increasing
x1 starting from the vertical intercept is to first use good-signal workers from the country
with higher investment, so initially the slope of the world production possibilities set must
be the same as the set to the left with kink at C. The graph is drawn for the case where
it is better to use high-signal workers from the low investment country than low signal
workers from the high investment country in Sector 1, but the result is fully general.
The Irrelevance of Size
Changes of the relative size of the countries will in general affect the asymmetric equilibria
due to price effects. The nature of such changes depends on the parameterization.
To illustrate that size does not confer special advantage as it does in agglomeration
models, we construct examples showing that scale effects may go either way. One way
is to look at the extreme case where λh is near zero (see Appendix B for details on the
computation). In this case the foreign (big) country operates as in autarky. In the (small)
home country instead, price effects are absent, because world price is only determined by
investment in the the foreign country. The examples are computed by setting λh = 1
Figure 10 panel (A) was computed using α = 1/2, η = .97, c = −0.005, c = .095 to
illustrate one case where only the big country can be rich. There is a unique symmetric
equilibrium at piA = 0.48. At the autarky equilibrium, incentives to invest in human
capital are decreasing in pi in the large country. In the small country instead, additional
investment does not have adverse price effects, and incentives BO increase with pi, but not
at a fast enough rate: the best response for the small country G(BO(pi, p = pA)) intersects
the 450 line only below piA. Therefore there are two asymmetric equilibria where the big
country invests at pih = piA = 0.48 and the other at pif = 0.05 or 0.29, both less than piA.
In the example of Figure 10 panel (B) instead, the small country can be either richer
or poorer than the big country. The figure was computed with the parameters as in
Numerical Example 1 (except for country sizes). Workers’ investment in the small country
is more responsive than in the previous example at the autarky equilibrium, where the
28
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Figure 10: Equilibrium fixed point maps: large (solid line) and small (dashed line) country
best response intersects the 450 line from below. Both
(
pih, pif
)
= (.27, 0.1) and
(
pih, pif
)
=
(.27, 0.59) are equilibria. Note that the responsiveness of the best-response function
to higher investment, which determines the location of the fixed points for the small
country above and below piA also depends on the shape of cost of investment distribution,
therefore, by changing the shape of the cost distribution one can easily construct examples
where differences between countries are large or small regardless of country size.
Finally, when the unique autarky equilibrium is at piA = 0, if the large country is
large enough only the small country can be richer. For example, if Example 2 above
is extended to allow for different country sizes, the country must fully specialize in the
low-tech industry if its size exceeds a critical value. Reducing the size of the country from
1/2 on the other hand only improves incentives. Hence, there are circumstances where
the only asymmetric equilibrium is that the small country becomes rich.
Taken together, these examples show that there may be scale effects in favor of either
the larger or the smaller economy, and that sometimes the equilibrium selection matters.
However, these are not really “country-scale-effects”. Instead, we prefer to think of them
as scale effects that depend on relative size of the North to the South. To understand,
suppose that there are n countries indexed by j ∈ {1, ..., n} , of size λj. Consider an
equilibrium in this model where the set of countries is partitioned into the sets P and R
and where pij = pip for all j ∈ P and pij = pir for all j ∈ R. Finally let λp = ∑j∈P λj and
λr =
∑
j∈R λ
j. This is an equilibrium if and only if (pip, pir) is an equilibrium in the two-
country model with countries of sizes (λp, λr). There may of course be other equilibria
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as well, but at least for this form of equilibrium the size of the individual country is
irrelevant and the relevant scale effect can be interpreted in our preferred manner.
A “development miracle” can be interpreted as a country that re-coordinates from
being part of the developing world to being part of the developed world. The model
cannot explain how such a re-coordination is achieved, but, if the economy is small, the
effects on the rest of the world are negligible. In contrast, a simultaneous re-coordination
of a significant fraction of the “South” leads to large relative price changes so that it is
not worth the while as long as there is no change in the “North”. Obviously, the model
is too stylized for policy recommendations, but this nevertheless suggests that it may be
misguided to use a few small successful countries as a model for all developing countries.
VII Concluding Remarks
We show that endogenous comparative advantages are possible between identical coun-
tries in an essentially neoclassical model. Specialization and trade arise due to an infor-
mational externality: workers are better informed than firms about their abilities.
Two-country model equilibria can be reinterpreted as n-country model equilibria
where countries cluster in two groups in terms of level of development. Equilibria of
the n-country model are neutral with respect to individual country sizes, so the model is
consistent with a world with no particular relationship between size and development.
A natural extension is to introduce physical capital into the production technology.
This would be interesting for analyzing the role of foreign capital and capital flight from
poor countries. As this paper focuses on the effects asymmetric information about skills
we have chosen to ignore physical capital. However, if capital and human capital were
complementary in production, the effects analyzed in this paper would be reinforced.
To understand, suppose initially that capital cannot flow between countries. Except
for a capital market equilibrium condition the model is more or less the same as the one
without capital. Consider an asymmetric equilibrium under the assumption that initial
capital endowments are identical. As capital is more useful in the high-tech industry the
return on capital is higher in the rich country, so, with free capital mobility, the rich
30
country must have a higher per capita level of capital. Notice that the movement of
capital from the poor to the rich country affects incentives to invest positively in the rich
country and negatively in the poor country, strengthening the incentives to specialize.29
Because this is a static model, we do not analyze incentives to migrate. Workers with
good signals in poor countries may find it advantageous to migrate where their skills
receive better rewards. However, such incentives are mitigated if employers recognize the
workers’ country of origin. When a foreign employer forms beliefs about a home country
worker’s productivity, she may take into account the worker’s nationality, therefore the
expected productivity computed by foreign and home country employers is the same.
Then, incentives to acquire human capital are defined by citizenship, not residence.30
A Appendix: Proof of proposition 1.
(Part 1) Consider an arbitrary equilibrium. Let x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) denote the world produc-
tion, where x∗i = λ
hxh∗i + λ
fxf∗i and x
j∗
i denotes the production of good i in country
j in equilibrium. Also let lj∗i (θ) denote the corresponding input of workers with sig-
nal g in economy j and sector i. By profit maximization p∗ix
j∗
i −
∑
θ∈g,bw
j∗
θ l
j∗
i (θ) ≥
p∗ix
j′
i −
∑
θ∈g,bw
j∗
θ l
j′
i (θ) for any alternative plan (x
j′
i , l
j′
i (·)). Adding over the two sec-
tors and imposing the market clearing conditions on the labor market we conclude that∑
i=1,2 p
∗
ix
j∗
i −wj∗g (ηpij + (1− η) (1− pij))−wj∗b ((1− η) pij + η(1− pij)) ≥
∑
i=1,2 p
∗
ix
j′
i −
wj∗g
(
lj1 (g) + l
j
2 (g)
)−wj∗b (lj1 (b) + lj2 (b)) for all possible alternative production plans (fea-
sible as well as non-feasible in the aggregate). Now for any feasible alternative allocation
lj1 (g) + l
j
2 (g) ≤ ηpij + (1− η) (1− pij) and lj1 (b) + lj2 (b) ≤ (1− η) pij + η(1− pij), implying
that
∑
i=1,2 p
∗
ix
j∗
i ≥
∑
i=1,2 p
∗
ix
j′
i for any feasible alternative (x
j′
1 , x
j′
2 ). Since this must hold
in each country we conclude that p∗x∗ ≥ p∗x′ for any alternative feasible world production
vector x′ = (x′1, x
′
2) . Moreover, in order for (x
j∗
1 , x
j∗
2 ) to be profit maximizing it must be
that
∑
i=1,2 p
∗
ix
j∗
i −wj∗g (ηpij + (1− η) (1− pij))+wj∗b ((1− η) pij + η(1− pij)) = 0. Finally,
29Details are available on request from the authors.
30However, employers may also condition their beliefs on migration status, which is as easily recogniz-
able as citizenship. This raises the possibility that migrants acquire a reputation for higher investment
than their fellow citizens who did not migrate, and that this belief is confirmed in equilibrium.
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since u is homothetic, from standard arguments we have that if (xj∗1 (w) , x
j∗
2 (w)) maxi-
mizes utility of a worker with income w, then (w
′
w
xj∗1 (w) ,
w′
w
xj∗2 (w)) maximizes utility of
a worker with income w′. Consider the program
max
x1,x2
u (x1, x2) (A1)
s.t p∗1x1 + p
∗
2x2 ≤ p∗1x∗1 + p∗2x∗2 = p∗1
∑
j=h,f
λjxj∗1 + p
∗
2
∑
j=h,f
λjxj∗2 ,
where the star-superscript refers to equilibrium variables. The aggregate consumption
bundle of any equilibrium must solve (A1) because the problem gets the relative consump-
tions of x1 and x2 right and p
∗
1x
∗
1+p
∗
2x
∗
2 is the aggregate world income. We conclude that if
x∗ is an equilibrium world consumption plan it must solve (A1). Since the set XW
(
pih, pif
)
is contained in the “budget set” of the representative consumer and x∗ ∈ XW (pih, pif) it
follows that x∗ must be a solution to (12).
(Part 2) Let x∗ solve (12) and let V =
{
x ∈ R2+|u (x) > u (x∗)
}
. Quasi-concavity
implies that V is a convex set. The set XW
(
pih, pif
)
is also convex (see Page 13).
Moreover, V ∩ XW (pih, pif) = ∅, so the separating hyperplane theorem (Theorem 11.3.
in Rockafellar (1997)) implies that there exists some p∗ such that p∗x ≥ p∗x∗ for all
x ∈ V and p∗x ≤ p∗x∗ for every x ∈ XW (pih, pif) . Let the wages be given by wj∗g =
max {p∗1µ (g, pij) , p∗2} and wj∗b = max {p∗1µ (b, pij) , p∗2}, and let the allocation of workers
be as in the planning solution. Observe in particular that if p∗1µ (θ, pi
j) > p∗2, then no
worker with signal θ is employed in Sector 2 in the allocation that produces x∗. This is
most easily seen in the differentiable case, where the optimality condition to (12) im-
plies that ∂u(x
∗)
∂x∗1
/∂u(x
∗)
∂x∗2
=
p∗1
p∗2
> 1
µ(g,pij)
. But, 1
µ(θ,pij)
is the cost of producing an extra
unit of good 1 by giving up some country j workers with good signal currently in pro-
duction of good 2, so we conclude that as if representative consumer would be better
off if some of these workers would be switched to the production of good 1, contra-
dicting optimality of x∗ if p∗1µ (θ, pi
j) > p∗2 and some of the j workers are assigned to
Sector 2. A symmetric argument holds for when the inequality is reversed. Hence, if
l∗j1 (θ) > 0, then p
∗
1µ (θ, pi
j) = max {p∗1µ (θ, pij) , p∗2} = wj∗θ , implying that the profit from
hiring any quantity workers with signal θ is zero in Sector 1, whereas if l∗j1 (θ) = 0, then
p∗1µ (θ, pi
j) ≤ max {p∗1µ (θ, pij) , p∗2} = wj∗θ , so no gain can be earned from hiring a positive
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quantity. The argument for Sector 2 is symmetric, which leads us to conclude that the
outputs and (implicit) allocation of workers in the solution to (12) are consistent with
profit maximizing behavior given the prices and wages constructed.
B Appendix: Equilibria when One Country is a Small Open
Economy
Equilibria can be calculated by solving two separate (different) one-dimensional fixed
point problems. Consider the incentives to invest in a country with fraction of investors
pi under the “small open economy” assumption that the price (of good 1) is fixed at p.
Equilibrium wages in the small open economy are determined to generate zero profits:
wOg = max {pµ (g, pi) , 1} and wOb = max {pµ (b, pi) , 1}. The incentive to invest in the
small open economy, denoted BO (pi; p) , is thus (using (15)),
BO (pi; p) =
(2η − 1)αα(1− α)1−α
pα
max {max{pµ (g, pi) , 1} −max {pµ (b, pi) , 1} , 0} . (B2)
If pA is well defined (i.e., whenever the autarky equilibrium is non-trivial), then
Bh
(
pih, piA
) → BO (pih, p = pA) for all pih ∈ [0, 1] as λh → 0 (B3)
Bf
(
pih, piA
) → B (pif) for all pif ∈ [0, 1] as λh → 0,
Assume parameters imply a unique autarky equilibrium, and call it piA. Let pA denote
the associated autarky price. If pi = piA, then BO
(
piA; p = pA
)
= B
(
piA
)
, and piA solves
pi = G
(
BO
(
pi; p = pA
))
. (B4)
While both (B4) and the autarky fixed point equation have piA as a common solution,
incentives diverge for other values of pi since in autarky the price changes as pi changes
whereas there are no such price effects in (B2). Equation (B4) will therefore in many cases
have solutions different from piA. Now, if piO solves (B4) and if d
dpi
∣∣
pi=piA
[pi −G (B (pi))] 6= 0
and d
dpi
∣∣
pi=piO
[
pi −G (BO (pi; p = pA))] 6= 0, then, for λh small enough, there exists an
equilibrium
(
pih∗, pif∗
)
in the trade model near
(
piO, piA
)
.31
31The slope condition for the autarky equilibrium is satisfied under the conditions that guarantee
the equilibrium uniqueness. Its role is that if the equilibrium was at a tangency with the 450 line, the
slightest effect from abroad could eliminate the equilibrium.
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